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Intra- and inter-generational social mobility have in the past played an important role in 
attempts  to  explain  fertility  behaviour,  and  continue  to  do  so  today.  The  opinions 
expressed  by  social  scientists  in  the  first  part  of  the  20th  century  are  renewed  and 
confirmed. More specifically: (1) intra-generational social mobility has been reinforced 
by the personal well-being aspirations and job careers of women; (2) status anxiety 
parents feel  for their children pushes  fertility down in large areas of the developed 
world  (mainly  in  southern  European  and  eastern  Asian  countries).  Therefore,  the 
provocative idea of Ariès that in the rich world, the child-king has now been replaced 
by the couple-queen does not perfectly hold. 
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1. Introduction  
When fertility began to fall in the now developed countries, some social scientists noted 
a  connection  between  upward  “social  mobility”  (henceforth  “mobility”)  and  low 
fertility. In developing his theory of social capillarity, Dumont wrote in 1890: 
 
Any man tends … to climb unceasingly, as oil rises in a lamp wick… For one who 
starts  at  the  bottom  to  arrive  at  the  top,  it  is  necessary  to  run  fast  and  not  to  be 
encumbered with baggage. Thus, while an ambitious man can be served by a good 
marriage… his own children, particularly if they are numerous, almost inevitably slow 
him down (quoted by Greenhalgh, 1988, p. 630-631). 
 
This idea of “competition” between one’s own children and upward mobility is 
key to explaining fertility transition. However, it is only one of many possible links 
between mobility and fertility. More than one population issue should be taken into 
account.  The  problem  may  be  divided  into  two  topics:  (1)  Fertility  and  intra-
generational mobility; (2) Fertility and inter-generational mobility. 
In reference to the first point, the concept of intra-generational social mobility (i.e. 
when an individual rises from one social class to another during her/his adult life) will 
be extended to include the personal well-being aspirations of the parents (i.e. when 
parents limit their fertility in an effort to improve their living conditions).  
In reference to the second point, the idea of inter-generational mobility (i.e. when 
children  belong  to  a  different  social  class  than  that  of  their  parents)  will  also  be 
extended to include parents’ aspirations of having high quality children. We do not take 
into consideration another aspect, or that of the impact of inter-generational mobility on 
the  fertility of the children themselves. The study of this topic, by authors  such as 
Bresard (1950); Girard (1951); Berent (1952); Westoff (1953, 1981); Westoff et al. 
(1961, 1963) and Zimmer (1981) has produced rather controversial results. 
Demographic  literature  is  herein  examined,  in  order  to  re-consider  from  this 
particular  point  of  view  several  explanations  for  both  fertility  behaviour  (not  only 
fertility  decline)  and  low  fertility,  in  developed  and  developing  countries.  This 
investigation also provides the opportunity to speculate on the future of post-transitional 
fertility patterns. 
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2. Fertility and intra-generational mobility: do personal well-being 
aspirations drive fertility choices?  
2.1 Contrasting pre-transitional and transitional periods  
According to Dumont’s idea of social capillarity, in a modern society, the smaller the 
size of one’s family, the higher one’s social climbing opportunities. This idea lies at the 
core of Davis’ (1963) interpretation of transitional fertility decline, as well as other 
authors  who  wrote  during  the  birth  depression  of  the  1930s,  such  as  Lorimer  and 
Osborn (1934, pp. 325-327) and particularly, Carr-Saunders (1936, ch. XVII). Their 
explanation  of  fertility  transition  may  be  convincing,  as  the  notion  of  a  close 
relationship between modernisation and fertility decline, emphasised by almost all of 
the fathers of the demographic transition theory, is best explained in terms of individual 
strategies. According to Davis, during and after the Industrial Revolution, three main 
social changes  were in contrast to  fertility: (1) the  new  industrial  world  gave  most 
people  new  upward  possibilities,  not  previously  available  in  traditional  peasant 
societies;  (2)  the  decline  in  infant  mortality  meant  an  increase  in  the  number  of 
surviving  children;  (3)  parents  no  longer  controlled  their  children’s  revenues,  as 
families lost their traditional function (see also Davis, 1937, for an apocalyptic vision of 
this last point). Consequently, in order to maximise their own opportunities, people had 
to reduce the “family strains” induced by modernisation and change their demographic 
behaviour. There exist different possibilities for bringing about change, depending on 
the  particular  historical  moment  (the  reason  why  Davis’  formulation  is  called  the 
“multiphasic transitional theory”). Individuals may emigrate, change marriage habits 
(the Malthusian, traditional “demographic answers” to coping with population growth 
preventively), or reduce their marital fertility. Commenting the article of Davis, Glass 
(1965) states that the main mechanism of change is the possibility of intra-generational 
mobility, since decline in infant mortality and parental control over children cannot 
induce demographic changes if social climbing opportunities do not work effectively. 
When  this  happens,  according  to  Glass,  “a  conflict  between  levels  of  living  and 
aspirations” triggers new demographic behaviour (p. 18). 
The  positions  of  Davis  and  Glass  have  been  enriched  by  years  of  population 
research  which  has  attempted  to  explain  fertility  transition  in  a  variety  of  ways. 
However, the notion that a contrast exists between upward mobility and high fertility is 
usually only implicitly affirmed. For example, the often quoted idea expressed by Coale 
(1973), concerning  the  necessity of a  “rational calculus”  to control  marital  fertility, 
assumes that, in a context of ongoing modernisation it is “rational,” i.e., “convenient,” 
for  parents  to  reduce  the  number  of  children  they  have.  In  a  competitive  market Dalla Zuanna: Social mobility and fertility  
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economy, this “convenience” corresponds to the maximisation of opportunities relative 
to one’s own upward mobility. 
This  opposition  between  the  “irrational  fertility”  of  peasant  society  and  the 
“rational fertility” of the changing and changed world is not shared by Caldwell (1982, 
2005). According to Caldwell, there is continuity in economic rationality before and 
after the  fertility transition and  maximisation of one’s own possibilities  for upward 
mobility or – at least – social security. Parents reduce marital fertility when, due to 
changes exogenous to the couple, intergenerational wealth flows are modified (before 
transition:  from  children  to  parents;  during  and  after  transition:  from  parents  to 
children).  Radicalising  Caldwell’s  viewpoint,  offspring  are  instrumental  tools  in  the 
hands of parents, who pursue their own interests. 
Other  authors  have  strongly  criticised  the  idea  of  a  difference  in  rationality 
between  past  and  present  fertility  choices  (see  Mason,  1997,  pp.  447-448,  for  an 
extensive review). However, these critics do not oppose the idea that aspiring to one’s 
own upward mobility could also have driven fertility choices in the past. Rather, they 
simply extend the concept, suggesting that couples in traditional societies also try to 
climb the social ladder (or at least maintain their social position) by managing their 
fertility. In order to achieve this aim,  when infant  mortality  was high, and parents’ 
control over children was significantly strong, it was “rational” to have many children 
and/or to use other “demographic responses” (such post-natal control – infanticide or 
other) to reduce the number of children to look after. Fertility choices depend on social 
organisation  and  contextual  circumstances  (i.e.  economic  situation,  social  class, 
episodic crises, and so on). 
However,  this  sort  of  “Olympic  economic  rationality”  shared  by  all  couples 
throughout history is not fully convincing. In many situations 
 
The  absence  of  family  size  limitation  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  children 
represent a net economic return to parents [the case of England during the Industrial 
Revolution is enlightening]. The evidence for contemporary societies is conflicting, but 
the assumption of a high demand for children in these settings is certainly unjustified 
(Cleland and Wilson, 1987, p. 17). 
 
This position is also shared by other authors who have empirically shown that – for 
pre-transitional couples – having a child is not economically convenient, especially in 
the brief and medium term (Lindert, 1980, see especially pp. 41-49; Smith, 1984). 
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2.2 Post-transitional period: women’s careers, preferences, and personal well-
being  
If we assert that rationality drives both pre- and post-transitional fertility behaviour, the 
idea  of  rationality  itself  should  be  extended,  considering  that  a  couple  wishes  to 
maximise all values, not only material ones. As shown below, this last idea has been 
applied extensively by the theorists of the second demographic transition in reference to 
the developed world during the second half of the 20
th century. 
The notion that there exists a contrast between fertility and one’s own mobility has 
been revisited over the last few years, spurred by the increasing proportion of women 
working in the labour market. Having a child may increase the risk that a woman will 
decide to give up her job, or stop or delay her career. According to some authors, the 
“irruption” of women into the labour market and their desire to pursue careers provide a 
key to understanding renewed fertility decline in the developed world over the last 30 
years, after the post-war baby-boom. The negative influence on fertility for women who 
pursue careers may be particularly great when public and private institutions (mainly 
welfare  systems  and  couples)  are  not  able  to  reconcile  the  time  women  spend  on 
production  and  reproduction.  This  has  occurred  in  the  lowest-low  fertility  cases  of 
southern  Europe,  German-speaking  countries,  and  eastern  Asian  countries  (see 
McDonald, 2000 for a theoretical approach; Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2003 for an 
extensive review; Hoem, 2005 for an analysis of lowest-low German fertility; Esping-
Andersen  et  al.,  2007  for  some  empirical  results  concerning  Spain  and  Denmark). 
According  to  this  theory,  and  in  reference  to  the  highly  industrialised  developed 
countries, the negative pressure of women’s careers on fertility is only a new version of 
the already mentioned contrast between the “industrial world” and the family. Settled 
agricultural  activity  –  based  on  the  family  unit  –  has  been  replaced  by  industrial 
production, which does not fundamentally depend on the family (Caldwell, 2004, re-
echoing Davis, 1937). 
The substantial continuity expressed in the above theory is not shared by theorists 
of the second demographic transition – SDT (see, e.g., van de Kaa, 2001, 2004). The 
SDT,  which  deals  primarily  with  the  post-modern  rich  world,  (even  if  developing 
countries may soon be “contaminated”), argues for the usefulness of defining a new 
transition,  given  that  the  motivations  for  reducing  fertility  have  changed  radically 
during the last 30-40 years compared with the previous century. This seminal idea is 
expressed by Ariès (1980, p. 650):  
 
Couples  –  and  individuals  –  no  longer  plan  life  in  terms  of  the  child and  his 
personal future, as was the case during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
This does not mean that the child has disappeared from such plans but that he fits into 
them as one of the various components that make it possible for adults to blossom as Dalla Zuanna: Social mobility and fertility  
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individuals. His existence, therefore, is related to plans for a future in which he is no 
longer the essential variable, as he was during the nineteenth century. 
 
According to Ariès, the first fertility transition was driven by the ideology of the 
“child-king,” that is, parents tried to favour the upward mobility of their children (see 
part three of this note). Instead, fertility nowadays is driven by the ideology of the 
“couple-queen,”  or  individual-queen/(king).  Provocatively,  Ariès  considers  this 
ideology to be a return to the Middle-Ages, when affectivity was not centred on the 
family and children.  
In post-modern society, the “existence” of children is due to the possibility of their 
becoming a post-modern value, i.e., conducive to the self-realisation of their parents. 
According to van de Kaa (2004, p. 77), before deciding whether or not to have a child, 
post-modern women ask themselves:  
 
Will  my  life,  and  the  relationship  with  my  partner,  be  enriched  if  I  interrupt 
contraception and use my basic right to have a child, or an additional child now? 
 
Hakim’s  (2003)  preference  theory  emphasises,  and  better  specifies  the  SDT 
hypothesis of fertility decline. She shows that, if one’s own “pure” preferences drive 
fertility choices, a relevant proportion (10-20%) of women now living in the Western 
world would follow career goals, renouncing motherhood, whereas a similar proportion 
would  be  happy  to  have  more  children,  renouncing  their  jobs.  Most  women  are 
necessarily  adaptive,  their  jobs  and  reproductive  choices  depending  on  external 
circumstances  (mainly  economic  burdens,  family  troubles,  and  the  welfare  system). 
Several empirical results show that as time passes, groups of women characterized by 
specific preferences emerge; these groups become particularly well-defined during a 
woman’s teens. However, it is not clear how preference patterns emerge during infancy 
and adolescence (Hakim, 2000, pp. 185-189). Other authors suggest that preferences are 
written into our genes, and that this genetic drive surfaces in post-materialistic societies, 
where  material  constraints  on  individual  fertility  preferences  are  weakening  (Udry, 
1994; Kohler et al., 1999; Kohler and Rodgers, 2003). 
In reference to the SDT, Hakim states that, in the post-modern world, individuals’ 
preferences have increasing influence over fertility and women’s own mobility. This is 
because for the first time in history – thanks to the contraceptive revolution and the 
ideational  “silent  revolution”  (Inglehart,  1977)  –  women  control  their  own  fertility 
choices. Empirical results, using both longitudinal and cross-sectional surveys, show 
that in the UK and USA, preferences arising at an early age influence fertility and 
family-oriented  women  have  twice  as  many  children  as  work-oriented  women.  Of 
course, real choices are obviously not determined by preferences alone, but also by Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article 15 
http://www.demographic-research.org  447 
contextual  circumstances.  The  strength  of  the  statistical  association  between 
“preferences” and fertility does not noticeably change if other variables (i.e. education, 
social class, etc.) are taken into account. 
Kohler et al. (2005) have recently developed another approach which concerns the 
preferences of parents. They link personal psychological “well-being” (measured by 
means of a direct question) with the number of children (see also the above authors for 
an  extensive  review  on  this  topic).  The  authors  use  data  from  a  panel  of  Danish 
monozygotic twins interviewed at the beginning of the 21
st century, and thus are able to 
control for genetic and educational endowments, and to emphasise the “pure” effect of 
childbearing on happiness. The main result of their study is that the first child increases 
the happiness of both parents, whereas more children do not add to the happiness of 
fathers and diminishes the happiness of mothers, especially if they are young. These 
results – although conditioned by the fact that they are limited to the Danish social 
context – suggest that, in the rich world: 
 
Women’s and couples’ motivations to have additional children may be less robust 
with respect to changes in the costs and benefits of children than their motivation to 
have at least one child. Desires for second and higher-order children may thus respond 
strongly  to  altered  socioeconomic  conditions,  family  policies,  social  norms,  or 
ideational context… Our analysis does not suggest that the individual motivation in 
terms of well-being for second and third children is sufficiently strong to result in a 
fertility level close to replacement level (Kohler et al., 2005, p. 436). 
 
The contrast between the traditional vision of fertility behaviour and that of the 
SDT in determining the “primary cause” of persistent low fertility in rich countries is 
profound:  the  former  emphasises  “long-term”  economic  changes,  while  the  latter 
stresses the importance of a post-modern ideological revolution. However, in spite of 
their divergences with regard to the “main driving cause” behind low fertility, the two 
visions  share  the  same  basic  idea  that  the  goal  of  maximising  one’s  own  situation 
influences the choice of having a child in contemporary rich countries. The concepts of 
“self-realization,” “preferences” and “well-being” may be considered post-materialistic 
versions  of  similar  concepts  such  as  “intra-generational  mobility”  and  “careers”. 
Neither the proponents of the traditional vision nor the SDT theorists explicitly take 
into account the desire for upward mobility and well-being of one’s own child as a 
possible force driving fertility decisions in the post-modern world. 
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3. Fertility and inter-generational mobility. Does “status anxiety” for 
children drive fertility choices?  
3.1 Contrasting pre-transitional and transitional periods  
In  1890,  when  Dumont  defined  social  capillarity,  he  stated  that  a  small  family  is 
brought about not only by the desire for a career, but also by the aspiration of parents to 
guarantee their children a better social position (see the quotation of Dumont by Ariès, 
1980, p. 647). Social researchers in the first half of the 20
th century generally shared 
this  view.  They  enriched  the  idea  of  an  opposition  between  the  social  climbing  of 
children and their parents with the notion of a contrast between fertility decisions and 
the possibility for upward mobility of children already born, in a context of growing 
competition between families (emphasis in italics added):  
 
[Marital fertility drops] because of the awakened ambition of the individual (…) 
[and] because parents are solicitous not only to maintain, but to raise, the social and 
economic position of their children (Taussig, 1911, Ch. 53, quoted by McNicoll, 2001, 
p. 131). 
 
It is quite generally recognised that most people who have a good social and 
economic status are highly desirous of maintaining it and will strive hard to prepare 
their children to maintain a similar status. Likewise, as freedom of thought increases, 
many people who have less desirable positions will revolt against their lowly status and 
will try hard to improve it and to enable their children to enjoy the benefits of a better 
status even though they themselves cannot achieve it. If we call this urge to maintain or 
secure a good social status “ambition”, then we may say that ambition is one of the 
most  important  of  all  factors  leading  to  the  voluntary  control  of  family  size  of  the 
family. (…) “It requires little argument to convince anyone that the great majority of 
couples with a good social and economic status will much more easily prevent the loss 
of the status or maintain it and ensure somewhat the same status to their children if 
families are relatively small. This is even more true of couples that are themselves 
trying to rise in social position and to ensure an improved status to their children 
(Thompson and Lewis, 1964, 5
th edition, pp. 320-321). These concepts were similarly 
expressed, albeit in different words, in the previous editions – the first printed in 1930). 
 
As  a  motive  for  keeping  the  size  of  family  small,  the  fear  of  unemployment  is 
probably far less important than the ambitions of parents for their children (…). There 
is a powerful incentive to limit the size of the family in the interests of the children (…). 
[To increase fertility] it is necessary to ensure that the member of the three or four Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article 15 
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child  family  is  not  handicapped  in  the  race  on  account  of  lack  of  equipment,  as 
compared with the member of the one or two child family” (…). In part the low fertility 
of the higher income classes is due to the possibility of what amounts to the purchase of 
positions  for  children;  for  the  fewer  the  children,  the  more  money  there  is  for 
expenditure in this direction” (Carr-Saunders, 1936, chapter XVII entitled: ‘The small 
family problem’). 
 
The higher the status of the family, the more costly it is to place the children in 
one’s own or in a higher occupation (Davis, 1937 – 1997, p. 621). 
 
When discussing fertility decline, the classic authors of the demographic transition 
commonly  shared  this  double  negative  association  between  low  fertility  and  the 
mobility  of  parents  (intra-generational)  and  children  (inter-generational).  These  two 
new  possibilities  for  social  climbing  meant  new  burdens  for  couples  who  in  turn 
reduced their fertility in order to “promote the health, education, and material welfare of 
the individual child” (Notestein, 1945, pp. 37-57). The family is seen as a competitive 
unit, which tries to maximise the well-being of all its members: 
 
In addition to all these facets of the subject, there is another, this emphasized by 
Dumont,  namely,  that  small  families  may  be  motivated  by  the  desire  of  parents  to 
provide better opportunities for the advancement of their children rather than by their 
own mobility ambitions (Westoff, 1953, p. 33). 
 
If each family is concerned with its prospective standing in comparison to other 
families  within  its  reference  group,  we  can  understand  why  the  peoples  of  the 
industrialising and hence prospering countries altered their demographic behaviour 
(Davis, 1963, p. 362). 
 
This double pressure on parents is also taken into account by Becker (1981, p. 12), 
in  his discussion concerning the possibility (or better, the rationality) of combining 
“altruism in the family and selfishness in the market place”. He adopts an evolutionary 
point of view, considered below. 
 
Altruistic parents might not to have more children than selfish parents [i.e. parents 
not altruistic towards their children], but they invest more in the human capital or 
quality  of  children  because  the  utility  of  altruistic  parents  is  raised  by  investment 
returns  that  accrue  to  their  children  (…).  Consequently,  children  from  altruistic 
families  tend  to  be  more  “successful”  than  children  from  selfish  families,  which 
expands  the  influence  of  altruistic  families  beyond  their  numbers.  Moreover,  their Dalla Zuanna: Social mobility and fertility  
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influence  might  grow  over  time  because  successful  parents  tend  to  have  successful 
children,  and  altruism  towards  children  is  also  likely  to  be  passed  on  from  one 
generation to the next. 
 
Lastly, Ariès (1980, pp. 646-647) expressed the most radical position: 
 
During this period [i.e., since the late 18
th century in France and the early 19
th 
century  in  the  rest  of  Western  Europe]  Western  society  was  shaken  by  a  veritable 
revolution in sensibility, a revolution as important as the French Revolution or the 
Industrial Revolution. Affectivity became centered about the family and the children. 
(…) It turned inward upon itself and organised itself in terms of the children and their 
future.  (…)  This  sort  of  planning  implied  the  desire  to  ensure  that  the  children’s 
economic  and  social  status  would  be  superior  to  that  of  their  parents.  Thus,  birth 
control was linked with social mobility. (…) To my mind, seeing that one’s children got 
ahead in a climate of social mobility was the deep motivation behind birth control. 
 
These  outcomes  have  been  enriched  by  several  studies,  mainly  with  regard  to 
societies  characterised  by  strong  ties  between  parents  and  children,  in  both  pre-
transitional populations as well as contemporary realities. Two important contributions 
made toward understanding the past include Johansson’s (1987a) work on European 
élites and Greenhalgh’s (1988) research on traditional peasant China. 
Sharing the viewpoint of Ariès, Johansson shows that the control of early marital 
fertility  by  continental  European  élites  was  determined  by  the  ideational  egalitarian 
movement born in Europe during the Modern Era and which triumphed during the 19
th 
and  20
th  centuries  (Flandrin,  1976;  Johansson,  1987b).  This  ideology  stresses  the 
concept that all couples’ children should have the same rights. Before this “egalitarian 
revolution,” in order to maintain the status of the family and the family patrimony, the 
strategy was to concentrate parental resources and the possibilities of marriage on the 
first  son  and  only  one  daughter.  Among  a  number  of  European  élites  after  the 
“egalitarian revolution” – long before the drop in infant mortality – all children had the 
right to marry and to inherit their parents’ patrimony. Consequently, couples had to 
reduce their fertility in order to reduce the number of potential heirs, thus saving social 
status  and  family  patrimony.  A  comparison  of  pre-  and  post-revolutionary  periods 
reveals that the aim of parents is the same (to maintain or improve family status), but 
that the micro-demographic strategy changes in order to fit the new ideational context. 
Ten  years  later,  Johansson  does  not  seem  to  adhere  to  Ariès’s  idea  of  changing 
motivations for fertility declines during the second half of the 20
th century (see part one 
of this note). Referring to the low fertility of contemporary populations, he echoes the 
views of American demographers of the 1930s: Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article 15 
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In socioeconomic terms the problem of demographic contraction could be framed 
as a natural consequence of socially constructed status anxiety. (…) In the twentieth 
century, people living in the developed countries (European or not) play the same role 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world as Europe’s materially privileged elites once did vis-à-vis 
Europe as a whole. At present the majority of any developed country’s population is 
“middle class”, meaning that most families are composed of status-anxious husbands 
and wives, who have small families (the two children norm) in order to maintain high 
standard of living for themselves, while avoiding downward mobility for the children 
(Johansson, 1997, p. 632). 
 
This idea of “status anxiety” is not only highly evocative but recalls Greenhalgh’s 
(1988) research on  fertility in  China during the pre- and post-transitional eras. The 
author describes a similar dynamic in a paper concisely entitled: “Fertility is mobility”. 
According to Greenhalgh, both during past centuries and today, one might think of 
Chinese  society  as  made  up  of  sets  of  families  competing  for  security  and  upward 
mobility. Compared to other pre-transitional contexts, within late-traditional Chinese 
society (during the Qing Dynasty: 1644-1911) there was an extraordinary degree of 
mobility: poor (male) children were also able to climb the social ladder by means of 
education (the cost of which was relatively low in Imperial China). The submission of 
children  to  parents,  attitudes  of  gender  inequality  towards  daughters,  and  lack  of 
egalitarian rules among siblings allowed parents to manage family resources (i.e. the 
work activities of their sons and the position of their daughters in the marriage market). 
Some sons and daughters worked hard in order to permit one (or more) male siblings to 
pursue  upward  mobility  by  means  of  education.  Consequently,  the  more  children  a 
family had, the greater the possibility of upward mobility for the entire unit or, at least, 
of maximum social security for parents and children. 
In looking at the rapid decline of fertility in China during the 1970s and 1980s, 
Greenhalgh illustrates three different processes which reduced fertility in Taiwan, rural 
mainland, and urban China. She suggests that the basic structure of the Chinese family 
has not changed. China continues to be characterized by sets of families who compete 
for  security  and  upward  mobility,  and  parents  who  invest  all  of  their  resources  in 
improving the social level of the family (by means of upward mobility of one or more 
children). However, environmental conditions have changed drastically, and children’s 
upward mobility may be better pursued when there are just one or two children, mainly 
due to the cost of education which has drastically risen. Moreover: 
 
The  reason  fertility  declined  so  rapidly  is  that  Chinese  families  in  all  [three] 
institutional  settings  responded  to  these  institutional  [i.e.,  exogenous]  changes  by Dalla Zuanna: Social mobility and fertility  
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applying and acting on traditional (economic) or modified-traditional (political-cum-
economic) cost-benefit analyses of how best to secure and advance their interests in 
these changed environments (Greenhalgh, 1988, p. 667). 
 
 
3.2 Lowest-low fertility contexts: the persistence of status anxiety for children in 
explanations of fertility behaviour  
The persistence over time of strong family ties may also be useful in explaining lowest-
low fertility in Italy and Spain over the last 25 years (see Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 
2003, pp. 248-250 for a review; see also Bettio and Villa, 1998; Dalla Zuanna, 2001, 
2004; Dalla Zuanna and Micheli, 2004). A title of a recent paper by Livi Bacci (2001) 
summarises the issue well: “Too few children and too much family”. The importance of 
family blood ties for those living on the northern shores of the Mediterranean Sea has 
long  been  different  than  for  those  living  in  central  or  northern  Europe.  This  is  a 
fundamental anthropological difference, which has differentiated these populations for 
centuries (Reher, 1998; Micheli, 2000). 
Authors who support this view are not suggesting that family is more important in 
southern Europe than elsewhere: family remains important everywhere and the notion 
that a close connection exists between modernisation and a weakening family remains 
debateable.  However,  in  southern  European  countries,  the  ties  between  parents  and 
children were and still are very strong, even after individuals are no longer in their 
twenties,  whereas  this  was  and  is  not  the  case  in  northern  Europe  and  in  overseas 
English-speaking countries. In northern Europe, during the Late Middle and Modern 
Ages,  the  "circulation  of  servants"  was  very  common  –  that  is,  the  habit  of 
"exchanging" children, who went to other homes to learn a trade. In southern Europe, 
this did not happen as frequently, as young people only went to work and live at their 
master's  residence  if  they  were  driven  by  severe  economic  need  (Reher,  1998). 
Consequently,  young  people  in  southern  Europe  did  not  leave  home  as  early  as  in 
northern Europe. Although the fading of rural society brought about  much change, the 
distinction  between  societies  with  strong  or  weak  family  ties  is  still  present.  With 
regard  to  Italy,  the  physical  proximity  over  time  between  children  and  parents  has 
actually increased: young adults not only leave the home later but when they do depart, 
they often end up residing nearby. Furthermore, visits between parents and children 
occur very frequently (Dalla Zuanna, 2001). The physical proximity of new couples to 
their families is also extraordinarily constant over time. For marriages celebrated in 
Italy over the last 30 years of the previous century, only 30% of new couples settled 
farther than one kilometre away from at least one set of parents, and one in four couples 
settled less than one kilometre from both sets of parents. Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article 15 
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This persistent proximity between parents and children has gone hand in hand with 
intense  exchanges  of  both  inter  and  intra-generational  nature.  Southern  European 
parents feel responsible in toto for building the human capital of their children, such 
that  the  upward  mobility  and  quality  of  life  of  their  children  takes  on  value  laden 
meanings  pertinent  to  their  very  own  existence.  From  this  perspective,  their 
exasperating “Malthusian prudence” is easy to understand. Not having a second or third 
child is due both to the fear of lowering the quality of life of the existing child (or 
children) and of not being able to guarantee sufficient resources for a new child. Hence, 
Italians have fewer children because they “love them too much" and not the other way 
around  (Palomba,  1995),  and  because  of  they  generally  feel  a  heavy  burden  of 
responsibility for the future of their children (Schneider and Schneider, 1996). 
Aspiring  for  one’s  own  children’s  mobility  is  a  powerful  fertility  reducing 
mechanism in other contexts as well. Commenting on an article by Casterline (2001), 
Haaga (2001, p. 55) states that: 
 
As Casterline points out, a  great deal of literature  suggests that aspirations – 
anxieties might be a better term – for the education of one’s children are connected to 
fertility decisions. (…) [Everywhere], once education is established as the principal 
determinant of status, of economic and social mobility, the rules of the [fertility] game 
have changed. 
 
However, a few lines later Haaga laments that:  
 
It is unfortunate how little direct evidence demographers usually have, or even 
seek, of what Casterline terms the mediating cognitive factors, i.e. factors that might 
connect aspirations and fertility behaviours.  
 
An  important  exception  to  this  dearth  of  research,  also  quoted  by  Haaga,  is 
exemplified  by  Knodel  et  al’s  (1990)  research  on  Thailand’s  transitional  fertility 
decline. The authors found clear-cut evidence of a causal mechanism linking the desire 
for children’s schooling and mobility, and family size limitation. Cleland and Wilson 
(1987, p. 22) have also highlighted similar results, in reference to the World Fertility 
Surveys collected in the developing world during the 1970s:  
 
Aspirations for education of children are often found to be negatively correlated 
with overall family size desires. 
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3.3 The dilution effect  
If we do not address the decisional processes affecting fertility choices, and look only at 
the influences of offspring number on the social mobility of children, the results are 
clear. As Blake (1989, p. 306) stated: 
 
[There  is]…  overwhelming  evidence  concerning  the  undesirability  of  large 
families for the children involved and, ultimately, for the educational quality of the 
society in question. 
 
Dealing with extensive post-World War II U.S. data, Blake finds that the smaller 
the family size, the higher the “quality” of children, particularly – although not always – 
from an educational standpoint (see chapter 9 of above volume, and Blake, 1985, for an 
exhaustive  summary  of  the  main  results).  This  regularity  holds  when  measured  for 
multiple cohorts and after controlling for several possible confounding variables, such 
as  the  parents’  social  class.  These  results  are  more  evident  for  the  highest  parities 
although clear differences emerge between only children and children with one or two 
brothers and/or sisters, particularly if higher educational levels are considered. 
Similar  results  have  been  found  for  Italy  (Dalla  Zuanna,  2006)  and  for  some 
developing  countries  during  the  fertility  transition  (see,  for  example,  Knodel  and 
Wongsith (1991) for Thailand, and Lloyd (1994) for comparative reviews). In order to 
explain  the  strong  association  between  number  of  sons-daughters  and  levels  of 
education in Thailand, researchers have built upon Blake’s idea of a “dilution effect”: 
the higher the number of siblings, the smaller the slice of resources available to each 
child. The statistical association was lower – although still clearly evident – during the 
transitional fertility decline in Vietnam (Anh et al., 1998). The authors believe that this 
result may be explained by the State’s heavy subsidising of education, making parental 
resource constraints irrelevant in determining a child’s schooling. In Thailand, on the 
other hand, the expense of children’s education is mainly borne by their parents. 
Although the above results are impressive, this kind of analysis has not been very 
popular among demographers: the number of studies conducted on the effect of parents’ 
education on their own fertility is certainly higher than those concerning the effect of 
parents’ fertility on the upward or downward mobility of children. The results presented 
above often result in a call for policies which oppose the negative association between 
family  size  and  education  (i.e.  reducing  school  expenses  for  children  with  several 
siblings, or linking family allowances with parity for siblings), in order to allow all 
offspring  similar  opportunities.  The  aims  of  this  kind  of  policy  are  principally 
egalitarian, but they may also increase fertility levels, as the responsibility of parents for 
the  “quality”  of  their  children  in  theory  diminishes.  Lastly,  if  parents  reduce  their 
fertility in order to improve the quality of their children, the above result has theoretical Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article 15 
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consequences, as it “proves” (ex-post) the rationality of couples’ decisions. Indeed, in 
many contexts where birth control is widespread, the lower the fertility of parents, the 
more rapid the race to conquer the highest rungs of the social ladder on the part of the 
children. 
Other important empirical evidence concerns Brazil and the black population of 
South Africa. Adopting a new-home economic approach, Lam (2003, p. 333) shows 
that “altruism in the family” prevails over “selfishness in the market place”:  
 
Until about eight years of schooling we do not see women responding to rising 
wages  with  significant  increases  in  labour  supply.  The  driving  mechanism  through 
which schooling reduces fertility, then, does not appear to be rising opportunity cost of 
time due to rising wages. Rather, couples respond to their increased productivity in 
producing  child  quality  by  reducing  the  number  of  children  and  investing  more 
resources in each child. 
 
With regard to comparisons of aspirations for upward mobility of parents to that 
for  their  children,  as  a  possible  motive  for  fertility  decline,  this  result  is  very 
impressive. As far as I know, it is one of the few empirical comparisons that directly 
evaluates the two possible interpretations, and has data that shows that – in a number of 
contexts – status anxiety for children drives the first stage of fertility decline. 
 
 
3.4 An evolutionary viewpoint  
The term “status anxiety” – which Haaga (2001) mainly uses to refer to developing 
countries  at  the  end  of  the  20
th  century  –  was  also  used  fourteen  years  earlier  by 
Johansson (1987a, not quoted by Haaga) in order to describe the motivations of the 
European élite to reduce marital fertility beginning in the early 18
th century (see above). 
Haaga (p. 57) describes “status anxiety” as an ingrained characteristic of humans; its 
contemporary  expression  is  explained  by  the  evolution  of  social  hierarchies  among 
mammals over thousands of years: 
 
Returning to humans, we are made very anxious by threats to our social position, 
and respond quickly to opportunities to advance our, or our children’s, social position. 
 
This view echoes the evolutionary explanation of fertility differences, which has 
recently become popular among scholars (Wachter and Bulatao, 2003; Aarssen, 2005). 
The main problem with this approach is the challenge of convincingly contextualizing 
transitional and post-transitional differential fertility and low-replacement fertility in an Dalla Zuanna: Social mobility and fertility  
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evolutionary perspective. If fertility is lower for the richest and most highly educated 
people and societies, the “golden rule” of evolution (i.e. the “fittest” individuals have 
more children who become parents) seems to be violated. This hurdle may be removed 
if the rule is partially changed: “the fittest individuals have better children who become 
parents”. However, in those societies based on livestock and agriculture (but not all, as 
shown in the first part), larger may have overlapped with better, although this may 
have been only a “brief” moment in the history of humankind. Nowadays, we may be in 
the same situation as our hunter-gathering ancestors, as stated by Wachter (2003, p. 10) 
who summarizes the main points of a chapter by Kaplan and Lancaster (2003): 
 
The modern concept of a quality-quantity trade-off in the demand for children has 
an  analogy  for  hominid  foragers.  Compared  with  chimpanzees,  hominids  came  to 
concentrate on an ecological food niche, including hunted prey and extracted nutrients, 
which  demanded  and  rewarded  skill  and  learning.  Prolonged  juvenile  training and 
dependence, protracted parental investment, larger brains, and longer life-span are 
seen  as  coevolving,  driven  by  returns  to  investment  in  “embodied  capital”.  In  this 
picture, evolution would have been equipping humans not so much with an instinct 
toward  maximising  total  fertility  as  with  instincts  for  adjusting  familial  resource 
transfers in response to the available lifetime returns to such investments. 
 
This idea is also addressed by Lam (2003, p. 336) who, in the last part of the 
above-quoted  chapter,  compares  evolutionary  and  economic  approaches  to  fertility 
decline. In his discussion of “the evolutionary origin of indifference curves between 
quality and quantity of offspring,” the author suggests that a quality-quantity trade-off 
in offspring is a highly plausible method of evolutionary adaptation. However, all of the 
above  authors  state  that  research  on  these  topics  is  only  in  its  infancy,  and  data 
supporting their hypotheses are controversial. 
 
 
4. Conclusions  
The principal idea put forth in this paper is as follows: it is possible to categorize the 
many  interpretive  frameworks  employed  by  population  scholars  to  explain  fertility 
decline in modern societies into two groups. The first group includes those who point to 
the  desire  on  the  part  of  parents  to  improve  their  life  conditions,  while  the  second 
highlights  the  anxiety  of  parents  for  the  future  conditions  of  their  children.  As 
emphasized several times in this article, these two types of aspirations are not always 
easily distinguishable one from the other. They can easily coexist for the same person, 
or even the same social group, as often pointed out in observations of the decline in Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article 15 
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births over the first half of the 20
th century. Beginning with Dumont and his theory of 
social capillarity developed towards the end of the 19
th century, a number of authors 
have  similarly  suggested  that  the  first  phase  of  fertility  decline  in  today’s  wealthy 
countries saw these two aspirations operate in tandem, dragging down both the number 
of desired children and those actually born.  
That  said,  this  distinction  continues  to  hold  considerable  merit  even  today,  as 
evidenced  by  the  numerous  authors  who  continue  to  refer  (either  implicitly  or 
explicitly) to these two types of interpretive frameworks. In particular, those scholars 
who  take  inspiration  from  Ariès  in  order  to  explain  the  changes  in  reproductive 
behaviour  that  have  occurred  in  post-modern  societies  (the  so  called  Second 
Demographic Transition), suggest that the personal well-being aspirations of the two 
partners have gained the upper hand with respect to the those projected towards the 
child (i.e. a shift has occurred: from the child-king to the couple-queen). Understanding 
lowest-low  fertility  across  the  broad  areas  of  southern  Europe  and  Eastern  Asia 
becomes  difficult,  however,  without  recognizing  that  in  these  regions  the  care  and 
responsibility felt on the part parents for the social advancement of their own children is 
greater than that found in other wealthy countries.  
As suggested by Becker, parents who are “altruistic in the family and selfish in the 
market  place”  are  in  an  advantageous  position  to  conquer  the  best  places  at  life’s 
banquet  for  their  (few)  children.  This  statement  has  been  largely  confirmed  in 
developed  and  developing  countries  by  the  inverse  relationship  between  number  of 
siblings and achievement, expressed mainly in terms of education. These “Darwinian 
families,” in competing with each other, closely resemble those families described by 
authors during the first half of the 20
th century, and by the fathers of demographic 
transition theory.  
However, an important difference emerges when comparing the traditional picture 
of  fertility  decline  with  what  has  actually  happened.  Nowadays,  in  the  rich  world, 
fertility is higher where family ties between parents and children are weaker (as in 
Northern Europe and in the overseas English-speaking countries), where “new” types of 
marital behaviour (i.e. cohabitation, extramarital fertility and marriage disruption) are 
widespread, and where gender roles within couples and society are more balanced (see 
Billari  and  Kohler,  2004,  for  an  extensive  empirical  overview).  The  idea  –  so 
widespread during the first half of the 20
th century, and incorporated into numerous 
formulations of transitional fertility decline theories (see e.g. Coale 1973, p. 54) – that 
the waning of the “traditional” family and fertility decline are closely intertwined, is 
negated by what has happened in developed countries over the last 20 years. A similar 
suggestion also comes from Cleland and Wilson’s (1987, p. 27) review of the WFS data 
concerning developing countries:  
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…the onset of demographic change [is not associated with the loss of] familial 
control of economic life. 
 
Summarising, empirical findings do not confirm the idea that in either developed 
or developing worlds, the weaker the family, the lower the fertility. Conversely, where 
family ties between parents and children have traditionally been strongest, the mounting 
aspirations  of  parents  for  their  children’s  quality  may  drive  fertility  far  below 
replacement level. This emphasises the contrast which exists between parents’ values 
and economic well-being and that of their children, particularly if the state (or other 
institutions) do not help parents to look after children’s quality (Aassave et al., 2005). 
The same pattern may also occur in the near future in many developing countries. In 
other  words,  what  has  happened  in  southern  Europe  and  most  developed  areas  of 
eastern Asia may also occur in other places with strong family ties between parents and 
children. As suggested by Caldwell and Schindlmayr (p. 257): 
 
…If  the  explanation  provided  by  the  Mediterranean,  largely  the  Italian  model, 
centered  on  patriarchy  and  the  breadwinner,  are  correct,  then  the  tendency  to  fall 
below replacement-level fertility as incomes rise will eventually occur throughout much 
of the rest of the world because patriarchy is widespread throughout Asia and Africa. 
 
The idea that fertility behaviour is guided by competition between groups related 
by blood (i.e. parents and children), each vying for their children’s upward mobility, 
does  not  fit  very  well  with  the  notion  that  fertility  is  driven  by  competition,  self-
realization,  preferences,  and/or  the  well-being  of  parents.  The  former  idea  inspired 
mainly  the  proponents  of  the  SDT  (Ariès,  1980;  van  de  Kaa,  2004;  Hakim,  2003; 
Kohler  et  al.,  2005)  in  their  efforts  to  explain  fertility  behaviour  in  post-modern 
societies today. But are these positions really in contrast to one another? 
The SDT has now started to emerge in southern Europe and eastern Asia, where 
post-materialistic  and  post-modern  values  have  become  increasingly  widespread. 
However, this is not necessarily in contrast to the value of children as “extensions” of 
their parents. Instead, the stress on blood ties may be seen differently, if the emphasis is 
placed on self-realization. Self-projection onto one’s own child may easily be assumed 
to  be  an  important  driving  motivation  in  post-modern  society  (van  de  Kaa,  2001). 
Moreover, this self-projection may be reinforced by weak “elective” family ties, i.e., 
those constructed on the basis of romantic love, cohabitation and marriage. The ties 
broken  by  a  marital  disruption  (which  is  also  rapidly  spreading  in  many  countries 
characterised by strong family ties, such as Italy, Spain, Japan, and South Korea) may 
be replaced by an additional emphasis placed on blood ties, i.e., connections between 
parents and children.  Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article 15 
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Although the post-modern desire for one (or more) child/ren may co-exist with 
other post-modern values and aspirations, they may also be in opposition, particularly 
where  the  blood  family  ties  are  strong,  and  public  institutions  leave  child-rearing 
primarily to parents, due in part to widespread rhetoric concerning the strength and 
importance of the family. 
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